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American
Postwar Influence in the Gulf
After WW2, the war that was supposed to make the World safe for
democracy, the U.S. supplanted Britain as the most powerful nation
in the World as well as in the Middle East. The postwar foreign
policy of the U.S. in the region has been characterized as one of
“Realpolitiks", which is defined as the ruthless pursuit
of national interests without regard for ethical principles".
Advocates of realpolitiks, which was popularized in the 1800s in
Europe, maintain that great nations do not have permanent friends
or permanent principles, but only permanent interests. They argue
that a country can achieve its foreign policy objectives by constantly
juggling, balancing & manipulating weaker states to serve its
own interests.
Rather than championing the cause of democracy, the U.S. quickly
established that apart from protecting Israel, oil--in readily available
amounts & at relatively low & stable prices--was its only
permanent interest" in the region, & that to safeguard
this interest it would not hesitate to actively interfere in the
internal affairs of the areas' nations. This was vividly illustrated
in 1949 when it orchestrated the Arab world's first postwar coup--the
overthrow of Syria's parliamentary government. This was the first
of many violent changes of government that the U.S. was to participate
in.
For the next four decades, the U.S. was to doggedly protect this
interest" & in the process betray all the ethical values
for which it supposedly stood, & earn the undying animosity
of the vast majority of the region's population. While some areas
of the World viewed the U.S. as a bastion of democratic government
& personal freedoms, the Arab world saw it as a rich imperialistic
power intent on supporting feudal monarchs, keeping the lid on any
reform movements & shrewdly manipulating local factions so that
it could continue to exploit the region's resources.
The extent to which oil dominated the U.S. foreign policy agenda
is reflected in a report issued jointly by the National Security
Council, the Department of State, the Department of Defense &
the Department of the Interior in 1953. It concluded that The operations
of the American oil companies in these oil-producing countries--how
much oil they produced & marketed & the price they paid
for it--are for all practical purposes instruments of our foreign
policies toward those countries....What they do & how they do
it determine the strength of our ties with the Middle Eastern countries."
The fundamental premise of the American oil policy, the paper went
on, rested on the presumption that the interests of the oil companies
& the U.S. government were parallel; the companies were reliable
instruments to achieve the goals of American foreign policy.
Arab Nationalism
& OPEC
The first serious challenge to the West's control over the oil fields
came in 1951 when the Iranian leader Dr. Mossadegh nationalized
Iran's oil fields which until then had been owned & operated
by British Petroleum. Two years later, the CIA organized a coup
which restored the Shah to power & control of the oil fields
to the Western oil companies. For the next decade, until the Arab
oil states along with some other oil-producing nations formed OPEC
(Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), the Western oil
companies exercised almost absolute control over the World's oil
supply & reaped enormous profits as the World's economy became
increasingly fueled by oil.
Following the Godahfi-inspired formation of OPEC in 1960, the Arab
oil-producing states began to clamor for a larger share of the wealth
being generated by their oil. Using collective bargaining techniques,
they sought more control over production & prices, while leaving
distribution & selling in the hands of the oil companies. Then
came the Arab-Israeli war in October, 1973, which was followed by
the oil embargo directed by the Arabs against the Western nations
perceived as aiding Israel in the conflict. In three months, the
price of oil rose 400%.
The U.S. learned from this that it could no longer manage its relationship
with the Gulf States through the oil companies. As the direct involvement
of the U.S. became more overt, it became clearer than ever before
that America was now committed to maintaining the oil fields of
the Persian Gulf in hands friendly to the U.S. & its Allies.
The Nixon Doctrine
What evolved became known as The Nixon Doctrine, whereby the U.S.
limited its own direct involvement in the region through the promotion
of a shared hegemony of the two major powers of the Gulf, Saudi
Arabia & Iran. These twin pillars of stability" would continue
to assure access to Persian Gulf oil for the West & in return
the weapons arsenal of the United States was opened virtually without
limit to both nations. A 1972 directive by National Security Adviser
Henry Kissinger ordered that Iran be allowed to purchase without
restriction the most sophisticated American weapons systems.
Realpolitiks Amongst
the Kurds
During this period, America, always true to its belief in realpolitiks,
was not averse to helping its client states destabilize their neighbors,
even if it had no vested interest in the outcome. A classic case
in point concerns the Iraqi Kurds in the early 1970's. According
to a U.S. House Select Committee on Intelligence Activities report
prepared in 1976, the Shah of Iran had met with Henry Kissinger
in 1972 to ask for help in destabilizing Iraq. Iraq had been harboring
an Iranian opposition figure, the Ayatollah Khomeini, & was
perceived as coveting the province of Khuzistan. The Shah and Kissinger
agreed that to restore the balance" that Iraq was upsetting;
the U.S. would covertly support the Iraqi Kurds, then in revolt
in Northern Iraq. The Kurdish leader, Mustafa Barzani, indicated
his willingness to participate, but only after he had first received
specific American assurances that assistance would continue until
the Iraqi government was overthrown.
However, the report states: Documents in the Committee's possession
show that President Nixon, Dr. Kissinger & the Shah hoped that
our clients (the Kurds) would NOT prevail. They preferred instead
that the insurgents simply continue a level of hostilities sufficient
to sap the resources of Iraq. This policy was not imparted to the
Kurds, who were encouraged to keep fighting."
The uprising had its desired effect, at least on Iraq, for in 1975
Iran & Iraq met in Algeria & signed a treaty ending their
border dispute, thus restoring a balance in the region. On that
very day, all U.S. aid to the Kurds was terminated--a decision that
was imparted" to Saddam, who immediately launched a search
& destroy operation in Kurdistan that has been going on ever
since. Barzani left the area, never to return. Later he was to express
his great bitterness, stating that he never would have taken the
Shah's word, but he hadn't expected that the U.S. would betray him.
Kissinger observed at the time that, Secret service operations are
not missionary work." The Kurdish aid program was, he explained,
merely an instrument to dissuade Iraq from international adventurism".
In an interesting footnote, the man who became director of the CIA
in early 1976 when this operation was being wound down & covered
up (George Bush), is the same man who has recently proclaimed that
Saddam was suddenly worse than Hitler".
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