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Irangate
At the height of the Iran-Iraq war, when the American aid to Iraq
was at its zenith, some high-ranking American officials indulged
in a sideshow of realpolitiks that probably amazed even seasoned
masters of intrigue such as Saddam. Irangate, as it became known,
took place secretly in 1986, & involved high-ranking members
of the Reagan Administration illegally selling arms to Iran, partly
in exchange for the hoped-for release of American hostages in Lebanon.
The proceeds from the sales were then covertly funneled to buy arms
for the Nicaraguan Contras, another illegal act.
The participants of this scheme alleged that they had President
Reagan's unofficial blessing, & agreed with their Iranian hosts
that there is a need for a non-hostile regime in Baghdad",
& that we can bring our influence to bear with certain friendly
Arab nations" to get rid of Saddam. All this was being said
privately, while publicly the U.S. was leading an arms embargo against
Iran, & letting it be known that it would not countenance an
Iranian victory! Small matter that these tactics of double dealing
on the part of the U.S. were perpetrating a war in which tens of
thousands of young Arabs & Persians were dying on the battlefield.
All this back-stabbing must have driven home two important lessons
to Saddam: The first was that the U.S. would intrigue against him
when he was weak; the second was that it would grovel before him
when he was strong.
This lesson was dramatically confirmed by two events the following
year. In early 1987, Iran threatened to attack Kuwaiti oil tankers
in the Gulf, which were carrying much of Iraq's oil to market. The
U.S., still smarting from the humiliation of the Irangate exposure
& eager to do damage control" with Saddam, offered to re-flag"
the Kuwaiti ships & ensure their protection by giving them a
military escort through the Gulf. In the same year, an Iraqi warplane
accidentally" fired an Exocet missile which hit the American
warship U.S.S. Stark, killing 37 sailors. Saddam moved quickly,
apologizing effusively, & promising compensation of $27 million
to the victims' families. The event was soon forgotten. Interestingly
enough, after the August invasion of Kuwait, it was revealed that
Iraq never actually made compensation.
Congress
Calls for Sanctions
Although the Iraq-Iran war ended in stalemate in 1988, Iraq did
not demobilize, but rather continued its military buildup unabated.
In the spring of 1990, Saddam began making threatening statements
about Israel, vowing to burn half the country" if Israel took
any hostile action towards Iraq, as it had in 1981, when it bombed
Iraq's nuclear reactor. This threat was taken to mean that Iraq
was willing to use chemical weapons, & coupled with the gas
attacks which had already been perpetrated on the Iraqi Kurds, caused
some members of the U.S. Congress to call for sanctions to be imposed
on Iraq.
White House Support for Saddam
The Bush administration, however, motivated by political expediency,
actively opposed any form of sanctions & instead counseled forbearance
& appeasement of Saddam, literally until the day Iraq invaded
Kuwait. With Iran's potential for exporting revolution largely crippled
by the costly war, the White House now saw in Saddam a possible
counterweight to the last remaining radical Arab strongman in the
Middle East, Haffez Assad of Syria. The Administration also hoped
to exert a moderating influence on Saddam in the hopes that he would
eventually forsake his hard-line rejectionist stance towards Israel,
America's premier client state in the region. As one Administration
official subsequently recounted, the policy was essentially, wean
the Iraqis away from nuclear & chemical proliferation, tie them
economically closer to the U.S. & the Western world; try to
use carrots, rather than sticks, in moderating their behavior."
In December of 1989, Congress voted to end Iraqi access to loans
from the Export Import Bank, due to Iraqi gassing of civilian Kurds
a few years earlier. In January 1990, President George Bush vetoed
this ban, citing America's national interest". In February,
1990, the Voice of America called Iraq a police state. Secretary
of State James Baker instructed Ambassador April Glaspie to apologies
to Saddam.
In the spring of 1990, Saddam began making veiled threats to his
Gulf neighbors, & staged military maneuvers in the neutral territory
on Kuwait's border. Iraqi resentment toward Kuwait & the other
Gulf states had been building since the 1988 cease-fire. In Saddam's
eyes, the rich Arabs, & indeed the World were not sufficiently
grateful for Iraq's sacrifice in the war. Iraqis had bled &
died in Iran in a war that had protected the sheikdoms from subversion
& conquest by the non-Arab Persians. Deeply in debt (primarily
to Saudi Arabia & Kuwait) as a result of the Gulf war, Saddam
warned them that they must forgive his debt & furnish more aid
or suffer reprisals. He also warned Kuwait that it must stop over-producing
oil, as this kept oil prices down, thus robbing Iraq of much-needed
income. And finally, he accused Kuwait of stealing Iraqi oil from
the Rumaila oil field, which straddled the Iraq-Kuwait border. In
March, Saddam gave a hint of what the future held when he abrogated
all border agreements between the two countries.
President George Bush, alarmed by these inflammatory statements
& actions, sent a Senate delegation to Iraq, which apologized
again for the Voice of America criticism & conveyed Bush's desire
for better relations. Senator Howard Metzenbaum told Saddam, I am
now aware that you are a strong & intelligent man, & that
you want peace." Senator Bob Dole, in reply to Saddam's charges
that there was a campaign against him in Europe & the U.S.,
reassured him, Not from President Bush", & added that the
President would veto any congressional sanctions. Senator Alan Simpson
said that, I believe your problem is with the Western media, which
are spoiled & conceited." After the meeting, Dole reported
back to Bush that Saddam is a leader to whom the U.S. can talk."
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